

## Commentary on Philippics Three and Four

## Comentário Sobre Filípicas Três e Quarto

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**ABSTRACT**

This paper offers a commentary on *Philippics Three* and *Four*. Firstly, it gives an historical background. Secondly, it deals with the rhetorical context in which *Philippics Three and Four* were designed. Doing so, it will consider some of the keys of Cicero's rhetorical art and mastery of the language. Finally, it analyses both texts as complex rhetorical artefacts.

**Keywords:** Cicero. Philippics. Rhetorics.

**RESUMO**

Este artigo faz um comentário sobre *Filípicas Três e Quatro*. Primeiramente, ele nos dá um contexto histórico. Segundo, analisa o contexto retórico no qual *Filípicas Três e Quatro* foram desenhados. Sendo assim, considera alguns pontos chave na retórica artística e no domínio da linguagem de Cicero. Por último, analisam ambos os textos como artefatos de retórica complexa.

**Palavras-chave:** Cicero. Phillippics. Retórica.

## 1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The *Philippics* (*Philippicae [orationes]*) of Cicero date back to one of the most convulsed phases of the History of Rome. The civil wars are shaking violently the city, where constant struggles, conspiracies and murders make impossible a period of peace and political stability. Somehow, when C. Julius Caesar accepted the office of Dictator for Life (*dictator perpetuus*), many citizens expected that under his power the peace and the stability will be recovered, as a sick body recovers the health under the supervision of an expert physician. Nevertheless, the political facts soon demonstrated that this feeling was by no means shared by all the Romans. When it became clear that Caesar would not give up to his extraordinary powers<sup>1</sup>, some people agreed in the need to avoid this development of the facts. Caesar's power had striped the Senate and the annually elected magistrates of their authority, which, for those men that would plan the murder of Caesar, was totally unacceptable. For them, the leadership of Caesar did not mean recovering the health of *The Eternal City*, but losing the *status* of free citizens, i.e. to become slaves. Differently stated, allowing the full authority of Caesar meant to renounce to the *res publica* in order to win a fake peace under the leadership of a *tyrant*.

In this turbulent atmosphere, a large group of senators, the so called conspirators, risked their life in order preserve the republican system and the political freedom. On the Ides of March 44 BCE they assassinated Caesar at a meeting of the Senate<sup>2</sup>. However, the intent of restoration of the republican system did not succeed at all. Although the conspirators tried to win popular support and legitimate their plan, they did not found the required support. The stability of the city threatened once again to be harshly broken, divided between the supporters of Caesar and those that wanted to restore the ancient Republic. To avoid a new civil war and to recover the calm, Marcus Antonius called the Senate on 17 March and it was agreed to give amnesty to Caesar's murderers, but also to ratify all the laws promulgated by Caesar. The internal battle had been averted, but without definitively solving the discordances. In fact, none of the two factions were totally satisfied. Despite Caesar was not alive and the conspirators had not to pay punishment for their plot, the *acta Caesaris* were valid and the Senate had not strength enough to continue with the restoration of the Republic. Marcus Antonius had leaded the situation in such a way that even if the civil struggle and the

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. RAMSEY(2003, p. 1).

<sup>2</sup> For which concerns the current paper, it is worth pointing that one of the active participants in the plot was M. Iunius Brutus.

political chaos had been avoided for a while, the conflicts had not finished. In fact, there was an increasing hostility in the city against the murderers of Caesar and many of them decided to leave the city so as to not to risk their life. Significantly, M. Brutus had to leave the city the 12 April.

Initially, after the assassination of Caesar, Marcus Antonius showed a Republican attitude. Thus, Rome approved some measures, as the abolition of the office of the *dictator perpetuus*, which seemed to prevent magistrates from following the same steps of Caesar, i.e. from the excess of power. Nevertheless, soon his policy started to appear egoistical and monarchical, so the conspirators and some other people started to consider the new attitude of Antonius dangerous and unacceptable for the *respublica*. Precisely, M. Tullius Cicero was one of those who started to suspect that Antonius was seeking for absolute power, which would strip the Senate of his authority<sup>3</sup>. Even if Cicero probably did not participate in the plot against Caesar<sup>4</sup>, he fully agreed with the action of the conspirators, as for him they had contributed to avoid that the *res publica* became a dictatorial monarchy. From his viewpoint they were not *conspirators*, but *liberators*. In the same way, he considered necessary to fight at that time against the still incumbent consul Antonius, since it was the only way to preserve the political freedom and a truth pace. As Manuwald (2007a, p.93) wrote, “In Cicero’s view Marcus Antonius was the main cause of danger to the *respublica*”. However, it is obvious that going against the still incumbent consul was not an easy or clear task, but a complicated and dangerous one. Of course, Cicero was not alone, but he had to increase his alliances as much as possible in order to fight for the republican system and against their enemies.

Undoubtedly, one of the strongest weapons of this *homo novus* was the power of λόγος. That is, the best way in which he could fight with Marcus Antonius was by means of the speeches. In fact, his *Philippics*, also known as *Orations against Marcus Antonius* (*orationes Antonianae* or *orationes in Antonium*), are part of this policy. In an analogous way as Demosthenes did it against Philip II of Macedon, Cicero fought ardently with his enemy to *save* his country. Of course, we do not intent to mean that the fight of the expert *orator* was just verbal, but the best way in which an expert rhetorician can transform the world in which he lives is none other but by means of a *discursive* strategy. Cicero and their allies were not strong enough to directly go against the current consul. Nevertheless, with his discourse device –among other tools—, he could launch a policy against him, trying to persuade the

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<sup>3</sup> These words of Manuwald points in the same direction: “Despite the positive start of Antonius’ rulership, Cicero had early on arrived at the opinion that Antonius was striving for absolute power” (MANUWALD, 2007a, p. 16).

<sup>4</sup> Cf. MANUWALD (2007a, p. 9-10); RAMSEY (2003, p. 3-4).

people, obtaining bigger support and legitimating their political wishes. The *Philippics* clearly show how Cicero fought against his enemy, trying to persuade the Senate and the Roman People in order to win more political strength. The goal was not to defeat his opponent in a rhetorical competition, but in the very facts. In this situation, he tried to reach it by means of the enormous potentiality of the speeches, i.e. using them as a political and military instrument<sup>5</sup>:

“Cicero did not hold an office in 44-43 BCE, but was an (influential) member of the Senate by virtue of his status as a consular, although he was not the first senator to be called upon throughout 43. Hence, Cicero did not have the chance to initiate immediate action on his own; the only (constitutional) strategy open to him was to rely on his rhetorical virtuosity and thereby make the Senate, regarded as the governing body, decree the necessary measures proposed by him” (MANUWALD, 2007a, p.90).

Of course, Cicero was not alone and the speeches delivered in the Senate and the *contiones* were not the only weapon of the partisans of the republican cause, but just a significant one. In this paper we will focus on the *Philippics* as a political and rhetorical weapon, but first it is worth to refer some of the most relevant political deeds surrounding the *Philippics*, and specially the *Philippics Three and Four*.

It is known that Antonius tried to improve his power by passing the *Lex de provinciis consularibus* in the Senate. According to some Romans, amongst which Cicero must be quoted, this decree violated the *acta Caesaris*, which had been previously ratified by Antonius and the Senate. By means of this law, Antonius wanted to get the Gallia Citerior and Gallia Ulterior instead of Macedonia. Nevertheless, D. Iunius Brutus, present governor of Cisalpine Gaul, refused with the support of Cicero to exchange his province with Antonius. Precisely, amongst other things, on *Philippic Three* Cicero tries to get the official legitimation to Brutus' refusal.

It is also worth highlighting that between April and May 44, period in which Antonius was not in the city, Octavian went to Rome and accepted the inheritance of Caesar. Even if until August 43 he could not formally ratify this inheritance, it meant that Octavian and

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<sup>5</sup> Manuwald notes how when he decided to publish the *Philippics* (but also other speeches), Cicero did not have just rhetorical purposes, but also political intentions: “This aim holds true even for speeches not delivered, but only distributed as pamphlets, and this function seems to have been particularly common in the Late Republic. Speeches delivered and published afterwards can reach an audience beyond the original one extending across the Roman Empire, which may function as an important contribution to and reinforcement of one's political strategy. For a wider audience becomes involved, and arguments and points of view can be presented more convincingly and may be better remembered when they are received under different circumstances and separately from the specific political debate. Especially when conflicts extend over longer periods and are not decided at one occasion, the publication of a speech soon after its delivery may influence future developments” (MANUWALD, 2007a, p.58).

Antonius were both potential candidates for Caesar's succession<sup>6</sup>. A big rivalry had grown between both of them and they started to recruit troops for a possible fight. Significantly, the *legio Martia* and the *legio quarta* from Macedonia, which previously belonged to Antonius, started to serve Octavian from November 44 onwards. These facts are of primary relevance to our paper, because, as part of his strategy against Antonius, Cicero tried to form a coalition with Octavian<sup>7</sup>, supporting him and the decision of the *legio Martia* and the *legio quarta*. Anyway, the orator was not naïve and he was aware of the great difficulties of this task. As Manuwald) states,

“Cicero was aware of the fact that Octavian originally was a Caesarian and consequently unlikely to become a true Republican immediately [...]. It was clear to Cicero that Octavian had to be brought to the side of the Republicans by assiduous efforts, not least by himself, but that there were other powerful influences, which were always likely to win Octavian over” (MANUWALD, 2007a, p.95).

In spite of understanding the difficulty and dangers of this purpose, he was determined about the necessity of launching this alliance, as it might be the only possible way to preserve the *res publica* and the freedom<sup>8</sup>: in other words, notwithstanding the uncertainty of the road, there was not other choice to save the republican system but to go over it. Of course, the History shows us that the fears of Cicero and other republicans were well rooted, but in that moment there were not other possibilities which offered more guarantees.

In this turbulent context, Cicero, who had come back to Rome on 9 December due to the political developments, delivered two speeches on 20 December: the first, in the morning, on a meeting of the Senate; the second, in the afternoon, in the Forum and addressed to the Roman People. These two speeches are *Philippics Three* and *Four* respectively, even if we cannot be sure till which point their author worked on them before its publication<sup>9</sup>.

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<sup>6</sup> It is meaningful how the *homonovus* refers to Octavian as C. Caesar (Cf. *Phil.* 3.3 ff.). Probably he is trying to influence the Senate to consider him as the true successor of C. Iulius Caesar. This possibility is not improbable, as later he affirms that after the Lupercalia Antonius should not be considered consul any longer (cf. *Phil.* 3.12; 3.14).

<sup>7</sup> The *Philippic Three* clearly shows this purpose.

<sup>8</sup> As stated by Manuwald, “on the whole [...], Cicero's attitude to Octavian was not unambiguous: it is well known that a sweepingly positive picture of Octavian is given only in the speeches. In private letters to some of his friends the picture is different or at least more differentiated: this evidence shows that Cicero considered Octavian the lesser evil in comparison with Antonius and valued him as a counterweight [...]. Therefore he wished to include Octavian in a great Republican coalition against Antonius. In the present political and military situation Cicero regarded collaboration with Octavian as the only sensible possibility since the Republicans could thus acquire the necessary military force” (MANUWALD, 2007a, p.94).

<sup>9</sup> Cf. MANUWALD (2007, p.54-65).

## 2. THE RHETORIC BEFORE THE EMPIRE

This brief chapter, which constitutes a sort of *excursus*, aims to show one of the distinctive features shared by Demosthenes and Cicero. To do so, we will not attend the peculiarity of their style, but we will focus on their relevance in the History of rhetoric from a socio-politic approach. Being aware that the length and the scope of this paper do not allow us to evaluate in deep the issue, we will just give some general remarks so as to highlight the close connection between the political system and the development of the rhetoric. Thus, we do not intend to give an accurate and exhaustive analysis, but just to offer an overview that helps to understand their relevance and position in the History of rhetoric.

As it is well known, Demosthenes' political situation in the end of his life was mainly similar to that of Cicero before his death. The following words of Wooten clearly express this common background:

“Demosthenes and Cicero lived at the great turning points of Greek and Roman civilization and were major participants in the drama that would lead eventually to the establishment of the Hellenistic monarchies and the Augustan principate. Their deaths mark the end of the independent city-state as the major form of government in Greece and republican government at Rome. Both resisted these changes and devoted their rhetorical talents, which were considerable, to a vigorous defense of the status quo” (WOOTEN, 1983, p.3).

Besides, it must be said that they did not just share a historical background, but that their role in the History of rhetoric is significantly analogous. With their intense debates in the assemblies, their huge amount of trials and *παρηγορία*, the political systems of the Classical Athens and the Roman Republic had constituted the appropriate background for the development of the speeches that belong to the *genus iudicale* and *deliberativum*. Of course, we do not mean that the epideictic speeches were leaved aside, but we would like to highlight that with the arrival of the Hellenistic monarchies and the Augustan empire the rhetoric was not able to develop real political speeches any longer. The Greek *ἀγορά* and the Roman *forum* lost their previous relevance as a focus of intense political debate. Without the socio-political conditions to deliver *free speeches*, the rhetoricians are forced to address their efforts to the *epideictic* speeches. In those periods, oratory becomes a specialized instrument of literature and stylistics<sup>10</sup>. Meaningfully, under the socio-political conditions of the Roman Empire, the

<sup>10</sup> With this we do not assert that stylistic and *epideictic* speeches were not developed before. Authors like Gorgias, Euripides or Catullus clearly show the opposite. What we aim to state is just that with the end of the Democracy and the Republic the deliberative speeches were not possible and that rhetoric had to develop in the field of the literature.

*controversiae* were almost a merely literary or scholar genre, in which the main scope was to develop a high level of artistry<sup>11</sup>. In this sense, we could assert that Demosthenes' and Cicero's rhetoric is somehow a rhetoric of crisis. They are the two last political orators before the fall of the city-states and *respublica*. In particular, their *Philippics* constitute the desperate attempt of two orator and politic men who try to fight against the imperialist movements that try to destroy the political system that constitutes the necessary ground of the *political debates of the free citizens* and *deliberative oratory*. In this sense, their *Philippics*, besides playing an active resistant role against the monarchical systems, they represent the desperate defense of the *political oratory* itself against the threat that menaces the necessary conditions that guarantee its survival.

Thus, Demosthenes' and Cicero's *Philippics* display a rhetoric in crisis, i.e. a rhetoric that fights against the process that will deprive it from its political meaning, transforming it in a different kind of discursive mastery. Anyway, from another point of view, they represent the zenith of rhetoric, as if the development of the previous years had taken rhetoric to its ἀκμή, just before its decline –or better said, before its transformation—. In this way, these works allow us to consider the *forensic* rhetoric in their most genuine and powerful nature. Obviously, we do not attempt to affirm that they are not refined and sophisticated stylistic constructions: any analysis of the texts clearly shows the opposite. However, we state that most likely the highest scope of these stylistic arte facts was to politically fight by means of their persuasiveness. That is, the rhetoric of crisis is also a rhetoric of splendor. The oratory, at least its *genus deliberativum*, reaches his summit in its most dramatic political context. Thus, these two speech-makers represent somehow the most superb but also the most tragic stage of the Greek and Roman rhetoric.

### 3. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS AND RELEVANCE OF *PHILIPPICS THREE AND FOUR*

As emphasized in the first chapter, the *Philippics* are a rhetorical arte fact with an important political goal: they do not only show the battle against Antonius, but also depicts the image of Cicero as a nice orator and great politician<sup>12</sup>. With the delivered speeches the

<sup>11</sup> Cf. SALAZAR (2003, p. 756-757).

<sup>12</sup> Cf. MANUWALD (2007a, p. 80). Besides, it is noteworthy that with the *Philippics* Cicero is not only going against Antonius, but also defending himself from the attacks of the latter. As Wooten wrote, "Antony had attacked Cicero's whole career, as a politician, as an orator, and as a man; and Cicero realized that his reply had to be a defense of his entire life" (WOOTEN, 1983, p. 51). Many passages of the text validate this assertion. Here



*homo novus* is making real politic and publishing them he also tries to appear in front of the people as a liberator and a virtuous speech-maker and politician. “All the speeches are naturally concerned with preserving the *res publica* and defeating Antonius”<sup>13</sup>, but, actually, a noteworthy amount of scholars have pointed that it is *Philippic Three* the speech which really initiates the series<sup>14</sup>. It has been defended that originally *Philippics One* and *Two* were not included in the series. In fact, only the twelve last speeches were delivered when Antonius was not in Rome. According with the scope of this paper it is not a primary issue to discuss about this problem, but it is fully meaningful to consider the special position of *Philippic Three* as the first speech of this series pronounced during the absence of Antonius. By means of it Cicero starts his strategy. He will intend to declare Antonius public enemy (*hostis [patriae]*), although he will do it indirectly, i.e. introducing preparatory measures that should lead in the future to achieve this difficult far-reaching goal<sup>15</sup>. Thus, somehow our present paper disserts about a departure point from which an attack towards the present consul is launched:

“only from *Philippic Three* onwards is the central term *hostis* (“public enemy”) used as a political and official catchword referring to Antonius (cf. *Phil.* 3.6 and n.). This expression does not occur in *Philippic One*, and *Philippic Two* talks more generally about Antonius’ position and conduct as a *hostis reipublicae*, *hostis patriae* or *dishominibusque hostis* (cf. *Phil.* 2.1; 2.2; 2.51; 2.64; 2.89). The foundations for the specific use of the term *hostis* with reference to Antonius are laid in *Philippic Three* and strengthened in *Philippic Four*, which interprets and intensifies the message of *Philippic Three*. More generally too, *Philippic three* is the starting point for Cicero’s fight against Antonius since it outlines his overall strategy” (MANUWALD 2007a, p.79).

Thus, these two speeches play a particularly significant role in the economy of the full work<sup>16</sup>. The main scope is settled and the strategy towards it is launched. Precisely, our

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follows a meaningful example: “*hunc ego diem exspectans M. Antoni scelerata arma vitavi, tum cum ille in me absentem invehens non intellegebat ad quod tempus me et meas viris reservarem. si enim tum illi caedis a me initium quaerenti respondere voluissem, nunc rei publicae consulere non possem. hanc vero nactus facultatem, nullum tempus, patres conscripti, dimittam neque diurnum neque nocturnum quin de libertate populi Romani et dignitate vestra quod cogitandum sit cogitem, quod agendum atque faciendum, id non modo non recusem sed etiam appetam atque deoscam. hoc feci dum licuit; intermisi quoad non licuit. iam non solum licet sed etiam necesse est, nisi servire malumus quam ne serviamus animis armisque decernere*” (*Phil.* 3.33). Another interesting example can be found in *Philippics* 4.15, where Cicero resorts to his struggle against Catiline, which probably constituted his most successful political deed, so as to compare it with his struggle against Antonius.

<sup>13</sup> MANUWALD (2007a, p.80).

<sup>14</sup> Cf. MANUWALD (2007a, p.82-86).

<sup>15</sup> Cf. MANUWALD (2007a, p.91).

<sup>16</sup> As Manuwald has pointed, “Cicero himself [...] frequently asserted of this speech “*ieci fundamenta rei publicae*” or presented it as a first step to liberty and to functioning *res publica* or to further actions (cf. *Phil.* 4.1; 5.30; 6.2; 14.20; *Fam.* 10.28.2; 12.25.2). He claimed to have recalled the weak and weary Senate to its *pristina virtus* and *consuetudo* on that day and brought to the Roman People the hope of recovering freedom (cf. *Fam.* 10.28.2)” (MANUWALD, 2007b, p.295-296).

commentary in the next pages will focus on describing how Cicero sets the main goal of his speeches and the way he tries to achieve it.

Said that, it is convenient to explain why it is important to elaborate an accurate analysis of both speeches and not just of the first of them. It has been defended by some interpreters that the two *contio* speeches, i.e. *Philippics Four* and *Six*, do not offer substantially new information, but that they only repeat their previous two speeches, i.e. *Philippics Three* and *Five*, but addressed to the People instead of the Senate. We will try to show that *Philippic Four* is not a mere repetition of the previous *lógos*, but an interpretation of it in which, depending on the different public it is addressed to and the specific aim sought, he stresses some of its points, according to what he thinks that it is more helpful to achieve his goal. Cicero uses rhetoric as it is more convenient for him, with full acknowledge of what he has to seek in the Senate and what in the popular assembly. Differently stated, all the speeches included in the *Philippics* form part of his defense of the *respublica* and his attack against Antonius; thus, they constitute a relevant part of it. They cannot be simple repetitions. Especially, if we have in mind that Cicero is an expert orator that uses the language and the speeches with full mastery:

“Cicero’s rhetorical works show that he was aware of the fact that speeches may be delivered before different audiences (mainly: senators, citizens, judges) and that they all require different types of orations. The appropriate character of a speech is determined by the amount of information already obtained by the audience and by the best way of addressing them. Cicero seems to have believed that the People have less knowledge and understanding than the senators and are to be approached on an emotional level [...].

However, that does not mean that Cicero regarded speeches before People as less important or less demanding. [...] Therefore, considering *contio* speeches as improvised *ad hoc* oratory is questionable. For Cicero may make his speeches appear as such, but actually the orations before the People are also rhetorically sophisticated” (MANUWALD 2007b, p.466).

So, *Philippic Four* should not be considered as a piece of scarce value in the overall work, but as a relevant part of the whole building. Moreover, it will allow us to understand better *Philippic Three*, as within the same day it offers an interpretation of it according to the new audience and circumstances; that is, with it we will be in condition to understand much better the starting point and the strategy of Cicero’s attack against Antonius.

In addition, the *apparent repetition* of a speech could also serve for other reasons. As Manuwald (cf. 2007a: 82) stated, with them Cicero could be highlighting the date of those speeches (in the case of *Philippics Three* and *Four*, the 22 December 44). In fact, they will be mentioned again in *Philippic Fourteen* (cf. *Phil* 14.20). As we have argued, this date

somehow constitutes the start of the efforts to fight against Antonius and thus, it must be considered as totally relevant.

*Philippics Three* and *Four* have in common that they are delivered within the same day and that they launch the strategy to preserve the *res publica* and to fight against its enemies. Moreover, the second speech is presumably given with the intention to inform Roman People about the decrees that have been accepted in the Senate during the morning. Nevertheless, we will try to show that Cicero does not offer the information in an objective way, but in such a way to lead them to the conclusions and the political position that he thinks more convenient.

#### 4. PHILIPPIC THREE

Cicero delivered his *Philippic Three* the 20 December 44. The tribunes of the *plebs* called together the Senate in order to discuss about the safety measures for the new consuls on 1 January 43. In the same morning, a message from D. Iunius Brutus arrived to Rome. He informed about his decision of not giving to Antonius the province of Gaul and its army. This fact is fully relevant. From that moment onwards Antonius has to deal with two fronts: on the one hand the refusal of Brutus to give him his province and on the other the military movement that Octavian is launching against him. With full acknowledgement of this situation, Cicero felt the need to take advantage of the political *καρπός*<sup>17</sup> (cf. *Phil.* 3.32; 3.34; 3.36), in order to try to do a common front against the current consul. So, when he appeared that morning in front of the Senate, he deviated from the main topic in order to use the occasion for his political purposes, i.e. to start his struggle against Antonius:

“In his oration Cicero mentioned the topic of the meeting as defined by the agenda as a starting point; however, he then went beyond it, by making use of a senatorial right [...], and focused on the general state of the conflict with Antonius as it presented itself after the initiative of D. Iunius Brutus had become known (cf. *Phil.* 3.13-14; *Fam.* 10.28.2; 11.6a). Only by this extension did Cicero turn the Senate meeting into a politically significant step in the struggle against M. Antonius” (MANUWALD, 2007b, p.299-300).

He aimed to use the meeting to legitimate the private activities –such as the resistance of Brutus—that sought to preserve the *res publica*. In the same way, he tried to give legal legitimation and honors to the activities of Octavian, *legio Martia* and *legio quarta*. Doing so,

<sup>17</sup> For further discussion on the concept of *καρπός* in Cicero’s *Philippics* and the possible influence of Demosthenes, see Manuwald (2007b, p. 308-309) and Wooten (1983, p.61).

he set the basics of his political position and implicitly introduced his goal: to declare Antonius *public enemy*. Obviously, he did not try to reach this far-reaching objective from the beginning, as it would not be possible. Cicero is clever enough to go step by step, trying to introduce his claim gradually in the way that it is most convenient. Nevertheless, in *Philippic Three* we can find implicitly the basics of the whole strategy that will be developed in the following speeches.

Once grasped which is the main scope of the *lógos*, its structure<sup>18</sup> can be fully understood: the central and more relevant section is found in *Philippics* 3.3-27, which can be divided in two subsections, even if they function as the both sides of a single coin. The whole section offers a negative view of Antonius, even if the first subsection (*Phil.* 3.3-14) does it in an indirect way and the second (*Phil.* 3.15-27) one directly. The former praises the private initiatives against Antonius launched by Octavian (*Phil.* 3.3b-5), *legio Martia* and *legio quarta* (*Phil.* 3.6-7), D. Iunius Brutus (*Phil.* 3.8-12) and the province of Gaul (*Phil.* 3.13a). Moreover, according with which has been stated, it asks the Senate to give honors to those who have the responsibility of the quoted initiatives (*Phil.* 3.13b-14). Searching the same goal, the latter criticizes the behavior of Antonius: first it attacks his edicts (*Phil.* 3.15-18) and then it censures his activities in late November 44 (*Phil.* 3.19-27). It is relevant to understand that both subsections point to the same aim. Legitimizing the initiatives against the current consul means to implicitly recognize that Antonius is an enemy of the *res publica* – this fact will become even more clear in the following *Philippic*—. The praise of Octavian and the others is not a simple encomium, but an indirect attack to Antonius. They are depicted as those who are defending the Republic against its enemy, namely the current consul. So, after going against him in an indirect way, the text launches a direct attack towards him.

The other passages of the text are used to introduce the central section and to extract from it the conclusion and the claims that are sent to the Senate: the introduction (*Phil.* 3.1-2) opens the speech in such a way that introduces the political topic that he wants to develop and it tries to produce in the audience the feeling that the present political circumstances demand an immediate action; in a similar way<sup>19</sup>, the conclusion (*Phil.* 3.28-36) appeals the Senate for a quick action against the current consul; finally, there is a *coda* (*Phil.* 3.37-39), where Cicero proposes to the Senate to gather up the issues developed in the speech by a decree.

<sup>18</sup> We follow the structure given by Manuwald (2007b, p.309), as we consider it fully appropriate. To see a slightly different proposal, see Martín (2001, p.301).

<sup>19</sup> Manuwald has well highlighted that the introduction and the conclusion share an analogous function and use rhetoric in such a way to make feel political urgency to the audience: “Although the focus of the first and last sections (*Phil.* 3.1-2; 3.28-36) is not exactly the same, they can be viewed as functionally similar, and the whole speech may therefore regarded as a ring-composition” (MANUWALD, 2007b, p.312).

Once presented the main characteristics of the speech, we will focus on one of the most significant rhetorical strategies that Cicero uses in *Philippic Three* – but also in *Philippics* in general—Maybe influenced by his advocate career and by Demosthenes<sup>20</sup>, Cicero shows in his position a Manichaean perspective, i.e. he presents the situation as if it would be the battle of good against evil. The *homo novus* thinks that *res publica* has been ruined –or at least damaged—with the governments of Caesar and Antonius, and his main goal is to maintain or reestablish it<sup>21</sup>. The question is depicted dramatically, as for him *res publica* means freedom (*libertas*<sup>22</sup>). On the contrary, that which goes against it or even that which is not doing efforts to preserve it –Cicero clearly goes against the inactivity and indecision of the Senate<sup>23</sup>—, is associated with tyranny (*tyrannis*) and servitude (*servitus*). Cicero is for the peace<sup>24</sup>, but he thinks that the only real context in which the peace can exist is the Republic. Thus, as he considers that there is no way to negotiate with Antonius about it, he is convinced that the only way to achieve the peace is by means of the war against the current consul and the enemies of the Republic. Thus, the arguments of *Philippic Three*, but also of the other *Philippics*, “are consistently oriented to disjunctive pairs such as “war or peace”, “republic or tyranny” and “liberty or slavery”” (MANUWALD 2007a, p.79). Cicero wants to persuade senators about the following idea: not to attack Antonius is to be supporting the slavery of Roman people. Moreover, he considers that the political context is so dramatic that those who love the freedom and Rome are forced to urgently act<sup>25</sup>. Accordingly, in the

<sup>20</sup> Cf. WOOTEN (1983, p. 46).

<sup>21</sup> This can be confirmed in many passages of the *Philippics*. The following text is just an example: “*quae sunt perdita consilia? an ea quae pertinent ad libertatem populi Romani recuperandam? quorum consiliorum Caesari me auctorem et hortatorem et esse et fuisse fateor*” (*Phil.* 3.19).

<sup>22</sup> Manuwald has rightly underlined the relevance of this term: “The single term refers to essential values of the Republican order [...]; they are specific to the Roman People and constitute the ideal for which Cicero fights against Antonius. Freedom is presented as a precondition for true peace” (MANUWALD, 2007b, p.306).

<sup>23</sup> With the clear aim to force the Senate to make politically relevant decisions, Cicero not only constructs the speech with a elevated tone of urgency –he insistently suggests to the Senate that they should not let the present political opportunity to prevent Antonius political aim, because in the future it could be too late to stop him (cf. e.g. *Phil.* 3.34)—, but he also argues in such a way that his speech should produce in the audience the feeling that if they do not act, their life and freedom will be in serious danger. For example, this rhetorical strategy can be regarded in *Philippics* 3.25: “*praeclare igitur facitis, tribuni plebis, qui de praesidio consulum senatusque referatis, meritoque vestro maximas vobis gratias omnes et agere et habere debemus. qui enim periculo carere possumus in tanta hominum cupiditate et audacia?*”.

<sup>24</sup> It can be inferred from *Philippics* 3.2 that in an ideal political situation the war would not be necessary and that only the dramatic and exceptional political situation makes it necessary: “*si aut Kalendae Ianuariae fuissent eo die quo primum ex urbe fugit Antonius, aut eae non essent exspectatae, bellum iam nullum haberemus. auctoritate enim senatus consensuque populi Romani facile hominis amentis fregissemus audaciam*”. Thus, Cicero claims that the war is necessary just because it is not possible to converse with Antonius (*Phil.* 4.11): “*non est vobis, Quirites, cum eo hoste certamen cum quo aliqua pacis condicio esse possit*”.

<sup>25</sup> Martín (2001: 304, n. 4) states that the *exordium* of this speech is constructed with the rhetorical structure known as *obiurgatio*, by means of which Cicero reproaches the Senate not to have actively participate in the political events, which has lead Rome to a dramatic situation.

introduction (*Phil.* 3.1-2) and in the conclusion (*Phil.* 3.28-36) of *Philippic Three* he wants to press people about the necessity to act as soon as possible:

“The tone of the speech is urgent, underlining Cicero’s attempt to present the situation as having been reduced to a basic and final conflict between freedom and tyranny, a conflict in which the senate must act rapidly if Roman liberty is to be preserved. The tone is brought out distinctly in the exordium, which opens with the word *serious* and ends with *celeritas*” (WOOTEN, 1983, p.60)

Cicero considers freedom and Republic in close relationship with *libertas populi Romani* and *auctoritas senatus*, but to preserve them the people and the Senate must fight against its enemy, namely, Antonius. In the same way, Antonius is depicted as a “monster”, that is as the enemy of the Republic that wants to subjugate all the Roman people under his absolute power<sup>26</sup>. So, according to his arguments, those who do not fight against him are implicitly giving their support to the end of the Republic and the consolidation of the tyranny. Cicero constructs the speech in such a way that the Senate must feel that he is forced to fight against the danger that puts at risk the maintenance of the Republic and their freedom. The following text is just a significant example of the rhetorical strategy used by Cicero to impel the Senate to actively participate in the process:

“Quapropter, quoniam res in id discrimen adducta est utrum ille poenas rei publicae luat an nos serviamus, aliquando, per deos immortalis, patres conscripti, patrium animum virtutemque capiamus, ut aut libertatem propriam Romani et generis et nominis recuperemus aut mortem servituti anteponamus”(Phil. 3.29).

Cicero constructs the arguments in such a way that the situation seems to be extremely simple. In one side there is the political freedom, *respublica*, and the fight against Antonius; in the other, the slavery, the tyranny and Antonius and all the people that supports him or does not fight against him. The disjunctive strategy is clear and the two possibilities are presented as mutually exclusive; there is no way for other alternatives. You are for the freedom and the real peace or you are for the tyranny and the slavery. Moreover, this position is taken to the extreme, as it can be seen in the previous quotation (cf. *Phil.* 3.29) and in many other texts of this *Philippic*:

“*nihil est detestabilius dedecore, nihil foedius servitute. ad decus et ad libertatem nati sumus: aut haec teneamus aut cum dignitate moriamur*” (*Phil.* 3.36)

<sup>26</sup> This same strategy can be observed in *Philippics* 4.11-15.

Republic or death, since living under the power of a tyrant goes against the dignity of men born to be politically free. Of course, Cicero does not only simplify the political context in two sides, but also develops his arguments in such a way that they should persuade any Roman citizen to think that the best and only logical behavior is that which fights against Antonius. If we look the structure of the speech and we focus in the main section (*Phil.* 3.3-27), we would realize that its two subsections form part of the so called *disjunctive mode*<sup>27</sup>. If there are some people that are launching private initiatives against the current consul, there are only two options: they are going against the legality and against the Republic, or on the contrary, it is the consul who goes against *res publica* and then indeed they are defending the country. Thus, these individuals should be punished or honored and the same –although in the opposite way— could be said about the current consul. If they have to be honored, it is because Antonius cannot be truly considered consul, but a *public enemy*<sup>28</sup> –there is no other alternative<sup>29</sup>– and that is what the second subsection tries to show in a more direct way. Anyway, Cicero plays with the arguments and this disjunctive mode in such a way that even if it is clear which of the two alternatives is the good one, he normally does not express it in an explicit way, as Manuwald points:

“Cicero’s whole campaign is based on one fundamental disjunctive pair: “either Antonius is consul and his opponents must be punished, or Antonius is a public enemy and his opponents have acted rightly”. It is introduced in *Philippic Three* (cf. *Phil.* 3.14) and frequently repeated in the speeches that follow without further arguments being adduced [...]. For Cicero, there is only one answer possible, which is clearly indicated in *Philippic Four* (cf. *Phil.* 4.2);

<sup>27</sup> For further information about the disjunctive mode, see Manuwald (2007a, p.112-115) and Wooten (1983, p. 58-86).

<sup>28</sup> This argument is explicitly developed in *Philippics* 3.14: “*quam ob rem omnia mea sententia complectar, vobis, ut intellego, non invitis, ut et praestantissimis ducibus a nobis detur auctoritas et fortissimis militibus spes ostendatur praemiorum et iudicetur non verbo, sed re non modo non consul sed etiam hostis Antonius. nam si ille consul, fustuarium meruerunt legiones quae consulem reliquerunt, sceleratus Caesar, Brutus nefarius qui contra consulem privato consilio exercitus comparaverunt. si autem militibus exquirendi sunt honores novi propter eorum divinum atque immortale meritum, ducibus autem ne referri quidem potest gratia, quis est qui eum hostem non existimet quem qui armis persequantur conservatores rei publicae iudicentur*”.

<sup>29</sup> Obviously, when Cicero reduces the possibilities to a mutually exclusive pairs, he is not describing objectively the situation, but trying to convince the audience by means of his interpretation of the facts. For example, when in *Philippics* 3.21 he analyzes the conflicts between Antonius and Octavian, he concludes that if they are fighting each other, one of them necessarily have to be enemy of Rome: “*necesse erat enim alterutrum esse hostem; nec poterat aliter de adversariis ducibus iudicari*”. And with this argument Cicero aims to show that Antonius considered himself –even if tacitly— enemy of the Republic: “*quid est aliud de eo referre non audere qui contra se consulem exercitum duceret nisi se ipsum hostem iudicare?*” And differently stated: “*si igitur Caesar hostis, cur consul nihil refert ad senatum? sin ille a senatu notandus non fuit, quid potest dicere quin, cum de illo tacuerit, se hostem confessus sit?*”. Anyway, it seems clear that they exist many other possibilities, as for example, that each would conceive Republic in an idiosyncratic way and thus, that each would fight against the other considering himself as the true defender of *res publica*.

elsewhere the continuous negative characterizations of Antonius suggest the obvious answer” (MANUWALD, 2007a, p. 111-112).

To finish with the analysis of this speech against Antonius, we will focus in a rhetorical strategy related with his disjunctive mode and his political goal. Due to his objective to persuade people about the idea that Antonius is a *publicenemy*, he will use the invective<sup>30</sup> to depict him as an entirely negligible person. The reason is clear, in his aim to show Antonius as a *hostis* he will make efforts to present consul not just as a bad politician, but as a perverse man and deviant from all the good customs of Rome. That is why he refers to him with many pejorative expression, as *furens* (cf. *Phil.* 3.2 and 3.31), *pestis* (cf. *Phil.* 3.5), *impius* (cf. *Phil.* 3.9), *sceleratus* (cf. *Phil.* 3.9), *impudens* (cf. *Phil.* 3.10), *impurus* (cf. *Phil.* 3.12), *impudicus* (cf. *Phil.* 3.12), *effeminatus* (cf. *Phil.* 3.12), *numquamsobrius* (cf. *Phil.* 3.12), *amens* (cf. *Phil.* 3.17), *homoadflictuset perditus* (*Phil.* 3.25), *taetra belua* (cf. *Phil.* 3.28), *impurus latro* (cf. *Phil.* 3.29) and *demens* (cf. *Phil.* 3.31), amongst others. The strategy is to depict the political enemy as a monster. He wants the people to fully repudiate him by means of his rhetorical arte fact.

It is important to notice that in *Philippic Four* the main scope –i.e. to declare Antonius *hostis*— is the same and that the disjunctive mode and the invective will be used as well, as key rhetorical techniques. The main difference is determined by the different nature of the audience it is addressed to, by the way the orator wants to impact on it, by the feeling that he want to produce on it, and by the different specific scope aimed by the speech.

## 5. PHILIPPIC FOUR

As mentioned above, *Philippic Four* was delivered the same day in which it was pronounced the previous one, but in the afternoon, in a popular assembly in the Forum<sup>31</sup>. Some magistrate<sup>32</sup> in office convened this *contio*—only they had the right to propose them—

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<sup>30</sup> Manuwald has underlined well the relevance of the invective in Roman political context: “for political or public conflicts in Republican Rome not only involved political programs or actions, but also the personalities of those who proposed or committed them. Attacking and ridiculing the personality of an opponent was often a more effective and psychologically more impressive means than a discussion of political beliefs. For what was important was not the factual basis, but the moral power of ideas and values adduced by the orator. [...] These insulting elements need not mirror his beliefs completely, but are likely to be the result of a consciously chosen strategy, since Cicero was aware of the fact that certain characteristics or incidents may be exaggerated for rhetorical and political purposes”(MANUWALD, 2007a, p.106).

<sup>31</sup> The change of the context determines the different way in which Cicero addresses the audience. In this *Philippic* he uses *Quirites* instead of *patres conscripti*.

<sup>32</sup> Due to the allusion of the end of the speech (cf. *Phil.* 4.16) it is generally thought that it was M. Servilius who called the *contio*.



so as the Roman people were informed about the decree passed in the Senate's session. This was a usual procedure, as many official decrees from the Senate were announced to the people by means of *contiones*. So, it was given to Cicero the opportunity to inform about the decree in the way he considered more convenient. This kind of public assemblies was merely informative, because it was not possible to vote –although in *contiones* it was possible to set future *comitia*, actually *contiones* were not *comitia*—. Anyway, even if the political pressure was not the highest, it was an important situation where it was possible to exchange political opinions and to influence other citizens.

The *contio* of the 20 December 44 was thought as the public scene where a Senate's decree must be announced. Nevertheless, it is obvious that Cicero would not restrict himself to objectively inform people about it. He took advantage of the opportunity given to him in order to influence the political opinion of the *populus romanus*. In the morning he tried to impact the Senate in such a way that it joined him and others in the fight against Antonius and in defense of the Republic by means of official measures. Even if the popular assembly to whom he speaks the afternoon has not the power to pass decrees—so, it obvious that the the immediate goal is not the same—, he tries to do something similar, that is to determine the opinion of the audience against Antonius by means of words. That is why *Philippics Three* and *Four* share a common far-reaching goal, but differ in the immediate objective they are intended for, as Manuwald points:

“although the subject matter of the two orations is roughly the same, they serve different purposes. By the Senate speech Cicero wished to persuade the senators to pass a specific decree; in the *contio* speech he informed the People of it as an established fact and tried to make them support it by influencing the general attitude of the audience. Therefore the *contio* speech builds on the recent Senate decree; on this basis it presents similar arguments in a different context and develops them further in connection with an interpretation of the decree. It is thus an integral element of the development and distribution of Cicero's concept and of its public impact” (MANUWALD, 2007b, p.471-472).

Delivered with different immediate scopes, they form part of Cicero's war policy against the current consul. It could be said that *Philippic Four* goes one step further in his strategy. Once the decree he proposed has been approved by the Senate, he wants to use this fact to influence also the citizens and to make progress in his fight. Thus he interprets the session of the morning not only to influence the audience, but to reinforce his previous speech and to extract important remarks. Significantly, he had been prudent enough not to include in his *coda* the claim to officially judge Antonius as *hostis* (cf. *Phil.* 3.37-39). On the contrary, in the following speech, in a scene that is not so politically relevant –thus, that it is not so

dangerous as the previous—, he will focus on this point, interpreting according to his interest the Senate's decree. Moreover, he will prepare the text for publication in such a way that it seems clear that all the people in the Forum agreed with his point of view. This fact is of primary relevance as Manuwald stated, since Cicero could be using the speech to win support also in future situations:

“Strategies employed to influence and exploit the view of the populace include emphasis on the size of the popular assembly, the repeated statement that Antonius has indeed been declared a public enemy by the senate decree as well as frequent references to the People's fervent approval of this assessment and of Cicero's view in general, while these reactions are cleverly elicited by the orator (cf. 4.1-2; 4.2-3; 4.5; 4.6-7; 4.8; 4.9-10; 4.11; cf. also *Phil* 5.2; 6.2; 7.22). Highlighting the opinion of the People and their agreement with Cicero's view is an integral element of his argument; still, this point might have been emphasized in the published version for greater effect on the reading public” (MANUWALD, 2007b, p.472).

Even if the Senate did not officially judge Antonius public enemy, in fact, the decree ordered to give honors to those who developed private initiatives against Antonius. Thus, Cicero analyzed this fact according with his disjunctive mode<sup>33</sup>, to suggest that indeed Antonius had already been declared *hostis* by the Senate<sup>34</sup>. Thus, after reaching his immediate goal in the morning session, Cicero continues firmly towards his big aim, namely, to fight against Antonius. With *Philippic Four* he tries to persuade the Roman People to support the decree approved in the Senate<sup>35</sup>. Doing so, he also attempts to ideologically unify the Roman citizens<sup>36</sup>, that is the patricians and the *plebs*, by means of a shared feeling of hate towards a common enemy, i.e. Antonius<sup>37</sup>. One is the enemy and one is the objective: to preserve *res publica*. Thus, all the Romans should fight together against Antonius. According to Cicero's perspective, Rome needs that the citizens fight together for the salvation of the city<sup>38</sup>. In fact,

<sup>33</sup> *Philippic Four* is especially rich in this argumentative technique. Cf. *Phil*. 4.2 ff.

<sup>34</sup> This matter is suggested from the very beginning of the speech (*Phil*. 4.1): “*nam est hostis a senatu nondum verbo appellatus, sed re iam iudicatus Antonius*”.

<sup>35</sup> Even more, his *Philippic Four* is delivered in such a way as it seems that there is already a general consensus against Antonius in the city (*Phil*. 4.2): “*nunc vero multo sum erectior quod vos quoque illum hostem esse tanto consensu tantoque clamore approbavistis*”.

<sup>36</sup> The issue is even more emphatically presented in *Philippics* 4.7. Not only Roman citizens, but all the people that loves the Republic should understand that it is necessary to do the war against Antonius: “*omnes mortales una mente consentiunt; omnia arma eorum qui haec salva velint contra illam pestem esse capienda*”.

<sup>37</sup> With this aim, Cicero uses the invective against his adversary in a similar way as he did in *Philippic Three*. For example, he resorts to some rhetorical exaggerations and insults (cf. e.g. *Phil*. 4.11-12; 4.15).

<sup>38</sup> Accordingly with the way that Cicero depicts his own image in the *Philippics*, he introduces himself as the main defender of the country (*Phil*. 4.1): “*princeps vestrae libertatis defendendae fui*”. See also *Philippics* 4.11: “*faciam igitur ut imperatores instructa acie solent, quamquam paratissimos milites ad proeliandum videant, ut eos tamen adhortentur, sic ego vos ardentis et erectos ad libertatem recuperandam cohortabor*”. See also *Philippics* 4.16: “*me auctore et principe ad spem libertatis exarsimus*”. Once again, it is clear that Cicero is not an objective journalist who informs about some facts, but an excellent orator and a politician.

this is one of the most relevant points in *Philippic Four*. The details given in *Philippic Three* are not so important in this speech, because the main scope is not to inform, but to get the support of the people against Antonius and to reach a political consensus between senators and citizens. That is why the private initiatives explained in *Philippic Three* are just briefly mentioned (cf. *Phil.* 4.2-9). The primary goal of both speeches is not the same, as it has been pointed. To state it in other words, it is clear that Cicero did not use the speech to inform objectively about the Senate's decree, but to announce it in such a way that it would persuade citizens of *The Eternal City* to fight together for the freedom against the potential tyrant.

In order to reach his goal, Cicero builds his speech in such a way that the audience should feel personally addressed: they should consider not only that their position is especially relevant to the development of the events, but that the facts will personally and dramatically affect them<sup>39</sup>. The victory or the defeat of Antonius does not affect Rome as an abstract entity; it is the freedom of each citizen which is dependent of the fate of Rome. Thus, the orator constructs the speech frequently using the personal pronoun *vos* and tying many times the possessive pronoun *vester* to relevant terms such as *libertas* and *hostis* (cf. e.g. *Phil.* 4.1; 4.2; 4.4; 4.5; 4.14; 4.15; 4.16), as Manuwald (2007b: 478) pointed. Moreover, the word *Quirites*, even if it is the usual form of address in *contiones*, appears in *Philippic Four* with more frequency than in other *contio* speeches of Cicero. This could mean that the speaker wants to underline the political role and responsibility shared by all the individuals attending the speech<sup>40</sup>. All of them form part of the *populus Romanus* (cf. MANUWALD 2007b, p. 476-477)<sup>41</sup>.

By means of the speech Cicero tries to lead the opinion of Roman People. Of course, he does it in different ways in the Senate and in the popular assembly, but both form part of the same rhetorical attempt to fight against Antonius. Manuwald has pointed in a remarkable way the big efforts of Cicero to develop the arguments in such a way that they should constitute a maximally efficient machine to psychologically affect the audience in the way that he intended:

<sup>39</sup> The following rhetorical question is just one of the many significant examples that can be found in the text (*Phil.* 4.4): “*quis est enim qui hoc non intellegat, nisi Caesar exercitum paravisset, non sine exitio nostro futurum Antoni reditum fuisse?*”.

<sup>40</sup> Said this, it is necessary to add that with the goal to encourage Roman People against Antonius *Philippic Four* uses a more optimistic approach than the previous *Philippic*. It can be checked in several passages of the text. See e.g. *Phil.* 4.10: “*Sive enim prodigiis atque portentis di immortales nobis futura praedicunt, ita sunt aperte pronuntiata ut et illi poena et nobis libertas appropinquet; sive tantus consensus omnium sine impulsu deorum esse non potuit, quid est quod de voluntate caelestium dubitare possimus?*”.

<sup>41</sup> In addition to the referred procedures, Martín (2001: 343, n. 1) points that the *exordium* has been constructed following a rhetorical procedure that aims to exhort the audience to feel confidence about their political power and to urge them to start a fight against Antonius.

“On the whole, the *contio* speech employs fewer sequences of argument and factual expositions than the corresponding Senate speech; instead, it relies on suggestive presentation, series of examples, hortative elements such as addresses, appeals, rhetorical questions, demands and exclamations, memorable and concise phrases, keywords, repetitions, exaggerations and similar stylistic features. Thus the most important facts can be conveyed clearly and vividly, the attention of the audience may be retained and their agreement finally won as the speech is impressive on the psychological level. The difference in audiences apart, this specific structure is a result of the fact that the People are not being motivated to take official measures against a powerful enemy, but that an existing Senate decree is presented to them as convincing and that they are to be strengthened in their courage and fighting power. This also explains why the threat posed by Antonius is depicted as less dangerous and the certainty of defeating him as a greater than in *Philippic Three*” (MANUWALD, 2007b, p. 478-479).

In the same sense, it has been underlined the importance the text which correspond to *Philippics* 4.11-16a. It is directly addressed to the citizens of Rome with an insistent appeal to join the fight against Antonius. Obviously, the structure of the speech is determined by the immediate scope pursued, and the *lógos* is developed in such a way that it should lead the souls of the audience to embrace Cicero’s cause.

The structure of *Philippic Four* is not especially complicated and the most of the commentaries give similar analysis<sup>42</sup>. As we agree with his analysis, we will follow the one proposed by Manuwald (2007b: 482-483). From the opening till *Philippics* 4.2a the text functions as an introduction, where the political situation is presented and it is emphatically pointed the relevance of the Senate decree approved in the morning; *Philippics* 4.2-10 constitutes the first main section, with which the citizens should be informed about the decision of the Senate to give honors to some of the recent activities for the Republic: first the text mentions the initiatives of Octavian (*Phil.* 4.2b-5a); secondly the speech informs about *legio Martia* and *legio quarta* (4.5b-7a); thirdly the activities of D. Iunius Brutus are mentioned (*Phil.* 4.7b-8); then, it refers to the province of Gaul (*Phil.* 4.9a); finally it offers conclusions and expectations that the audience should take in mind in the future (*Phil.* 4.9-10). After informing about the initiatives that the Senate’s decree prescribes to honor, the second main section (*Phil.* 4. 11-16a) exhorts the audience to war. The text offers several reasons to justify this and some additional remarks: the impossibility to reach a true peace with Antonius (4.11-12a); the consensus of the Senate and the Roman People, and the courageous nature of the Romans (4.12b-13); the illegal activities and weakness of the opponent (*Phil.* 4.14-15); Cicero’s contribution to recovering freedom (*Phil.* 4.16a). Finally,

<sup>42</sup> Cf. e.g. MANUWALD (2007b, p. 482-483); MARTÍN (2001, p. 341).

the speech reaches its end with a conclusion (*Phil.* 4.16b) where it is emphasized the relevance of the present day.

As in the previous speech, the orator develops the arguments and constructs the *lógos* in the way that he thinks more appropriate to produce persuasion in the audience, i.e. to influence them in the political situation.

## 6. CONCLUSION

To conclude with this brief analysis of two of the *Philippics*, we would like to make emphasis on a general consideration given in the first chapters. *Philippics Three and Four*, which somehow open the war strategy against Antonius developed by means of speeches, constitute a sophisticated rhetorical arte fact. The rhetorical mastery of the orator is used to produce a maximally efficient political tool. The language is shaped in that way to politically impact the audience<sup>43</sup> according to a concrete ideology. It is clear that the *homo novus* does not merely inform about the political facts; in the same way, he does not use language in a neutral way. To the contrary, Cicero takes advantage of his rhetorical mastery to persuade his audience and influence their ideology. The way in which he depicts Antonius and his own portrait given in the text are clear examples of this fact; they are not objective pictures, but sophisticated and ideologically deformed *representations* that should produce concrete feelings in the audience. In the same way, the most of the arguments, which have been constructed with the appearance to be logical and rigorous, are built from unproven facts; even more, some of them constitute fallacies or they simplify the reality according to Cicero's political purpose. In summary, the orator uses the power of *lógos* as a political instrument to change his world.

To some extent, the stylistic resources and the subtleness with which the words are shaped are at the service of political goals, i.e. they are tools to politically affect the audience by means of the speech. That is, rhetoric itself works as an instrument to lead the opinion of the people. Obviously, to assert that rhetoric –and the *Philippics*– only works in a political or judicial level would be excessive, but by means of the emphasis given to this issue the current paper has tried to highlight that the nature of rhetoric itself depends on its political context. That is, the oratory developed during the Classical Period of Greece and during the Republican Rome differs from the one developed in the Hellenistic Period and under the

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<sup>43</sup> With “audience” we do not merely mean the people who heard the speeches in the Forum, but also the readers of the published text.

Roman Empire. Significantly enough, the *Philippics* by Demosthenes and Cicero constitute somehow the tragic attempt of the *political* rhetoric itself to save the political background that constitutes its *habitat*. The *Philippics* represent a very specific moment in the History of rhetoric. From one point of view, they show the crisis of the *forensic* rhetoric –i.e. of the rhetoric developed in the *Forum*, that is the political rhetoric— in the moment in which it desperately tries to survive. On the contrary, from other point of view they represent the zenith of the *forensic* rhetoric, as they display the splendor achieved by it after a long development.

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Contribuição dos Autores	J. L. Lera
1) concepção e planejamento.	X
2) análise e interpretação dos dados.	X
3) elaboração do rascunho ou na revisão crítica do conteúdo.	X
4) participação na aprovação da versão final do manuscrito.	X